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Abstract 
The broad objective of the study was to examine the impact of audit client attributes and variables on audit fee in 
Nigeria. Specifically, the study examined if client size, Profitability, Complexity, Fiscal Year end and Industry exert a 
significant effect on audit fees in Nigeria. The population of the study covered all quoted companies on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange (NSE) from 2007-2011. The study used secondary data obtained from the published annual accounts 
and reports of one hundred and fifty three (153} companies from eleven (11} sectors quoted on the Nigerian stock 
exchange from 2007-2011. The simple random sampling technique was used in the selection of companies from the 
population. The variables were analyzed using descriptive and correlation analysis. Thereafter, fixed effects regression 
analysis was conducted. The results showed that client size, Profitability, Complexity, Fiscal Year end and Industry exert 
a significant effect on audit fees in Nigeria. The results seem robust despite controlling for industry of operation of the 
firms using dummies. The study recommended that there is the need for effective regulation of audit pricing as market 
framework for determining the audit fees may not readily suffice as an advantage for the fostering of auditor 
dependence. 
Key words: client size, profitability, complexity, audit fee and fixed effects regression. 
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Introduction 
Audit pricing is concerned with the determination of remuneration for auditor services that relates directly and 
flmarily to the audit function. Following the market framework, early studies (Simunic 1980; Palmrose, 1986; 
lltterworth and Houghton 1995; Davidson and Gist 1995) used the market framework to identify the determinants of 
lditpricing and hence the audit fee. 
Over the years, a preponderance of research has been devoted to unraveling the determinants of audit fee for 
feveloped economies. They include the US studies, like Rubin {1988); Ettredge and Greenberg {1990); Pratt and Stice 
(1994); Taylor and Simon (1999); Callaghan, Bell, Landsman and Shackelford (2000); Mellett, Peel and Karbhari (2007); 
Parkash and Singhal {2008); and Bedard and Johnstone {2010). Similarly, the UK studies include Brinn, Peel and 
f~gbertsI (1994); Moizer, {1997); Pong {2004). Besides, studies from France include Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, 
12007), Denmark (Thinggaard & Kiertzner, 2008), Finland (Niemi, 2004), Belgium {Caneghem, 2009), Australia (Carson, 
fargher, Simon and Taylor, 2004; Carson and Fargher, 2006). 
~weverI it will be misleading to assume explicitly that findings in the developed countries in respect of audit fee 
l!terminants can be taken ipso facto as being exactly the same in the developing economies. This study therefore 
looked at certain peculiarities which exist in the audit market for emerging markets like Nigeria, such as the existence of 
a few business entities listed on the stock exchanges. Similarly, the audit environment, general business environment, 
tgulatory framework, culture, technology, legal and business sizes differ very significantly across the globe (Davidson 
and Gist, 1995). These factors could in fact impinge or reflect in one way or the other in the determination of the audit 
fee. 
Our study contributes to the literature in two principal ways. First, we examine several client variables using fixed 
effects techniques and thus taking unobserved firm differences into account. Second, we conduct sensitivity test 
ltroducing sector dummy variables in our estimation and hence investigating if activity sectors moderate the client 
laracteristics-audit fee relationship. 
Uterature Review and Hypothesis Development 
This section discusses the meaning of audit fee and provides a review of the literature on audit firm characteristics 
(audit client size, profitability, complexity, fiscal year-end date and industry). It also presents the theoretical 
Jlderpinnings of this study. 
Audit fee 
Audit fee refers directly to payments made to the auditor that relates directly to the audit function, non-audit fees are 
IX)ncerned with payments for other non-audit services rendered by the auditor. Since the early work on the pricing of 
audit services by Simunic {1980), substantial progress has been made in understanding the factors which are involved 
in the determination of audit pricing or audit fee. Studies document that auditor pricing is a function of auditor effort 
and perceived audit risk (e.g., Simunic, 1980). Dinh {2012) explains that the demand for audit services comes from 
~mpany owners, outside investors, company managers, governments and general public. Generally, the audit fee 
should cover audit costs and provide a reasonable profit. Therefore, the audit fee can be seen as a combination of two 
kerns; audit cost and profit or auditors reward. 
Audit Client Characteristics and Audit Fee 
As earlier stated, audit client characteristics includes audit client size, audit client profitability, audit client complexity, 
•udit client fiscal- year-end date, and audit client industry. 
Audit Client Size 
pbviously, compared to auditing small-sized clients, auditing large-sized clients makes a need of spending more time 
and effort. External auditors have to spend more time for client meetings, understanding client complicated intemal 
control systems, designing more audit procedures and conducting more test of detail {Steward and Munro 2007). To 
this end, as the fees paid to auditors depend on the amount of time to complete the job given, it is expected that larger 
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companies have to pay higher audit fees. A considerable body of empirical auditing literature has focused on 
researching the role of auditee size in charging audit fees (e.g., Joshi & Bastaki, 2000; Gonthier-Besacier & pcha~ 
2007; Ahmed & Goyal, 2005; Brinn, et al., 1994). These studies support the typical assumption that auditee size has a 
significantly positive influence on audit fee determination. Consequently, we state the hypothesis as follows; 
H1: There is significant relationship between Audit client Size and Audit fee. 
Audit Client Profitability 
Audit client profitability is an important indicator of management periormance and its efficiency in allocatinl 
available resources. Joshi & AI Bastaki,{ 2000) explain that companies reporting high levels of profits will be subject~ 
extensive audit testing of their revenues and expenses and this will result in higher audit fees. Prior research 
{Firth,1985; Dugar, et a1.,1995 and Waresul & Moizer, 1996) indicate that the amount of audit fees is significan~ 
influenced by the profitability ratio {Sandra & Patrick, 1996). 
H2: There is significant relationship between Audit Client Profitability and Audit fee. 
Audit Client Complexity 
In previous studies, proxies for complexity have included the number of subsidiaries, the number of industries in 
which the company participates, the number of different company locations and variables relating to asset 
composition. Basically, audit fees are dependent on how long auditors have to spend for a particular audit 
engagement. This may therefore imply that companies with complexity will be charged higher audit fees. Auditee 
complexity has been of interest in researching into determinants of audit fees, such as Joshi and Bastaki {2000); 
Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt {2007) ; Ahmed and Goyal {2005) Thinggaard and Kiertzner {2008). Most results are 
found to be consistent with the view that auditee complexity has a significant relation with audit fees. Consequently, 
we state the hypothesis as follows; 
H3: There is significant relationship between Audit Client Complexity and Audit fee. 
Audit Client Fiscal Year-end Date 
Peters {2011) finds that majority of companies has the same fiscal year-end date of December 31. And time around 
December 31 is called the busy season for auditors. In this period, auditors, especially auditors of big auditing firms 
usually have to work overtime. Prior researches seem to point to the direction that auditor behaviors can be affected 
by a higher demand for audit services during the busy season {Sweeney and Summers 2002; lopez and Peters, 2011). 
lopez and Peters {2011) find that December year-end companies have lower likelihood to change auditors. 
Consequently, we state the hypothesis as follows; 
H4: There is significant relationship between Fiscal Year-end date and Audit fee. 
Audit Client Industry 
It can be argued that each industry has its own peculiar characteristics and this might dictate the audit style and audit 
approach which could invariably impinge on the annual fee charge by the auditor. Auditors take different audit 
procedures for different industries. In this sense, audit fees charged will be different. For instance, Gonthier-Besacier 
and Schatt (2007) subdivided French listed firms into firms in information technology {IT) sector and others to test the 
impact of industrial sector on audit fees. The result indicates that audit fees paid by companies in IT sector were much 
higher than that paid by the others. Consequently, we state the hypothesis as follows; 
H5: There is a significant relationship between Audit Client Industry and Audit fee. 
Theoretical Framework 
The theory underpinning this study is the agency theory. The agency theory deals with the contractual relationship 
between the agent (manager) and the principal (shareholders) under which shareholders delegate responsibilities to 
the manager to run their business. This theory argues that when both parties are expected to maximise their utility, 
there is good reason to believe that the agent may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the principal's 
interest. Jensen and Meckling {1976) modeled this condition as an agency relationship where the inability of the 
principal to directly observe the agent's action could lead to moral hazard, thus increasing agency cost: 
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does the determination of audit pricing fall within the context of the agency theory? This question is answered 
we consider clearly the contributions of Jensen and Meckling (1976). According to Jensen & Meckling (1976), a 
-.nnon1ent of the agency costs is represented by the monitoring costs supported by shareholders for the monitoring 
managers actions. The audit fees are an important component of these costs, as long as auditors have to make 
that managers act according to the shareholders' interests, while also auditors have the required task to inspect 
.accounts of the company. 
llethodology 
Panel data design which may be seen as a combination of both cross-sectional and time-series design properties is 
IISed for this study. The panel design is a method of studying sample units periodically observed over a defined time 
hme. The population consists of all companies quoted on the Nigeria Stock Exchange as at December 31, 2011. There 
were 250 securities listed on the Exchange (NSE, Factbook 2011). The sample size for this study was based on Yamane's 
b'ITlula (1967).Following the formula; the minimum sample size for this study is 132 quoted companies at 5% levels. 
Ire therefore choose to use one hundred and fifty three (153) companies. The simple random sampling technique was 
jldopted in the sample size. In this study, secondary data, by way of annual reports and accounts of the sampled 
pnpanies in Nigeria and some relevant NSE fact books were used to collect data for five years (2007 to 2011). 
Model specification 
Based on the agency cost theory enumerated above, the model in this study is specified as follows: 
~feeI =a 0 + j3 1Sizeit + j3 2Profitit + 13P ompit + 13 4Fisy1f.1 + j35 Indit + e it 
Where: 
Audfee = Measured as Natural log of Audit Fee 
Size = Measured using Natural log of Total Asset 
Profit = Profitability measured using Profit after tax 
Comp - Complexity measured using number of subsidiaries 
Fisyr = Fiscal Year end measured as a dummy; '1' for companies ending fiscal year at December 31 and a 
value 0 if the year-end date is not December 31. 
lnd = Industry which was classified into financial and non-financial. The variable is treated as a dummy and 
the value of "1" for financial industry and "0" to companies in non-financial industry. 
= Stochastic term 
= number of sampled cross-sectional firms (1, 2 ... 153) 
= time period of the sampled companies (2007-2011) 
~e apriori signs are 131 > 0, lh > 0, l33 > 0, !34 > 0 1P~> 0, 
Empirical Result 
This section contains the panel regression result and interpretation of the result. It entails the application of statistical 
~hniques to provide the basis for the testing of the research hypotheses, which invariably formed the basis for 
recommendations and conclusions at the end of the research. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
AUDFEE SIZE PROFIT IND FISYR COMP 
Mean 2.281889 8.9526 15495.05 0.34 0.72269 43.617 
Maximum 9.035987 16.864 7111318 1 1 659 
Minimum 1.427116 -1.2039 -234693 0 0 0 
Std. Dev. 1.937508 2.2599 233784.8 0.474 0.448 91.527 
Jarque-Bera 250.8118 42.0575 28761930 187.5866 222.217 8304.8 
Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Observation 1071 1069 1069 1071 1071 1071 . 
Source: Authors computation (2014) 
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Table 1 presents the result for the descriptive statistics for the variables. As observed, Log of AUDFEE has a mean value 
of 2.282 with maximum and minimum values at 9.0359 and 1.427 respectively. The standard deviation of 1.9375 is low 
and suggests that the audit fee across the companies exhibits considerable clustering around the average. SIZE 
measured as the log of total assets is observed to have a mean value of 8.9526 with maximum and minimum values of 
16.864 and -1.2039 respectively. The standard deviation of 2.2599 that the sizes of the companies cluster around the 
average firm size for the sample. The mean for PROFIT is 15495.05 with maximum and minimum values of 7111311 
and -234693 respectively. 
The standard deviation of 233784.8 suggests considerable dispersion of profit values for the sample from the mean 
which indicates that there is a big difference in profitability among companies. FISYR has a mean value of 0. 723 which 
suggest that about 72% of the firms have companies end their fiscal year at December 31 and The standard deviation 
of 0.474 is low which indicates that most companies in the sample have their year-end in December. The mean for 
COMP (Complexity) measured as the number of subsidiaries operated by the company is approximately 44 with 
maximum and minimum values of 659 and 0 respectively. 
The minimum value of zero suggests that some companies in the sample do not operate any subsidiary. The standard 
deviation of 91.527 suggests some level of difference in the degree of complexity of firms in the sample. IND (industry) 
was classified into financial and non-financial. The variable is treated as a dummy and the value of "1" is assigned to 
companies that belong to the financial industry and "0" to companies in non-financial industry. As observed, the mean 
is 0.34 indicating that 34% of the companies in the sample are in the financial sector while the remaining 66% are in the 
non-financial sector. The standard deviation is 0.474. 
Table 2: Correlation Results 
AUDFEE SIZE PROFIT INO FISYR COMP 
AUDFEE 1 0.02971 0.022692 -0.10821 -0.07177 -0.02345 
SIZE 0.02971 1 0.266461 0.04967 0.024678 0.056833 
PROFIT 0.022692 0.266461 1 -0.01728 0.035744 -0.01511 
IND -0.10821 0.04967 -0.01728 1 0.145268 0.278485 
FISYR -0.07177 0.024678 0.035744 0.145268 1 -0.04123 
COMP -0.02345 0.056833 -0.01511 0.278485 -0.04123 1 
Source: Authors computation (2014) 
From table 2 above, the correlation coefficients of the variables are examined. However of particular interest to the 
study is the correlation between; (i) Audit client variables and Audit fee As observed, a positive correlation exists 
between SIZE and log of AUDFEE (r=0.109). Though weak, the direction of the association suggest that bigger firms 
may incur higher Audit fees. A positive correlation is also observed between PROFIT and log of AUDFEE (r=0.052). 
Though the coefficient is weak, the direction of association suggests that profitability of the firm tends to increase the 
audit fee. A positive association is observed between IND and log of AUDIT FEE (r=0.077) and this implies that a 
particular industry or sector can be associated with higher Audit fee though the correlation coefficient is weak. FISYR is 
observe to correlate negatively with log of AUDFEE (r=-0.042). COMP is positively correlated with log of AUDFEE 
(r=0.276). An evaluation of the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables indicates the unlikelihood 
of multicollinearity. 
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression Result 
Variable (A) (B) 
SIZE 1.381E-05* (0.028) l.llE-07* (0.028) 
PROFIT -1.08E-06 (0.888) -3.80E-07* (0.000) 
IND 3.117 (0.158) 0.407* (0.000) 
FISYR -12.170* (0,038) -0.241 * (0.000) 
COMP 0.158* (0.000) 0.006* (0.00) 
intercept 170.826 (0.000) 2.218* (0.000) 
Fin.Serv. dummy -0.180* (0.007) 
Health.C dummy 0.572* (0.005) 
ICT.dummy 0.559 (0.069) 
lnd.gds dummy -1.929* (0.000) 
Nat. Res dummy -1.353 (0.098) 
Oii&Gas. Dummy 1.376* (0.000) 
Serv. Dummy 0.224 * (0.000) 
R· 0.720 0.796 
ADJR· 0.673 0.759 
F-Stat 14.979 21.507 
P(f-stat) 0.000 0.00 
D.W 1.8 1.6 
.. Source: Authors Comp1lat1on {2014) * s1gni/1cant at 5% **significant at 10% 
N.B: ()indicates the p-values. 
2014 
Where: Fin.Serv= Financial services sector, Health C= Health care sector, ICT= Information and communications 
technology sector, lnd.Gds= Industrial goods sector, Nat.Res= Natural resource sector 
Oil and Gas= Oil and Gas Sector Serv. =Services Sector. 
Table 3 above shows the result for the Model which examines the effect of audit Client characteristics on Audit fee. 
Specifically, the result clearly provides empirical evidence of the effect of Audit Client Characteristics (Company size, 
Profit, Industry, Fiscal year end and Complexity) on Audit fee. Firstly, we observe that with the fixed effects estimation 
(Panel A) the R· is 0.720 which suggests that the Audit client Characteristics explains about 72% of systematic 
variations in AUDFEE with an adjusted value of 0.673. The F-stat (14.00) and p-value (0.00) indicates that the 
hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables cannot be rejected 
at 5% level while the D.W statistics is 1.8. Commenting on the performance of the Audit-client variables, we observe 
that SIZE appears to have a positive (1.381E-05) effect on AUDFEE which is also statistically significant (p=O.OO) at 5% 
level. PROFIT appeared to have a negative (-1.08E-06) effect on AUDFEE though not significant at 5% (p=0.888).1ND 
appeared to have a positive (3.117) impact on AUDFEE though not statistically significant at 5% (p=0.158). The effect 
of FISY appeared negative (-12.170) and also statistically significant at 5% (p=0.031). In addition, COMP appears to 
exhibit a significant (p=O.OOO) and positive (0.1S8) impact on AUDFEE. 
To address the industry effects on audit fees, the regression model was run with industry dummy variables added 
(Panel B), the regression result shows that the R· is slightly higher than what we observed without the inclusion of the 
industry dummies. Specifically, we find that Audit clients characteristics is able to explain about 79.6% of systematic 
variations in AUDFEE with an adjusted value of 75.9. The F-stat for the model indicates that the model is significant at 
5% as their p-values are all less than O.OS while the D. W statistics is 1.6. Commenting on the performance of the 
Audit-client variables, we observe that SIZE variable is positive and significant (l.llE-07, p=0.028). PROFIT is observed 
to have a negative effect on AUDFEE which is significant (3.80E-07, p=O.OOO). The IND variable appears also to be 
positive and statistically significant at 5% (0.407, p=O.OOO). COMP is also observed to have a positive effect on AUDFEE 
which appear significant at 5% (0.006, p=O.OOO). 
Finally, we find that FISYR also remained negative and statistically significant at 5% for fixed effects (-0.241, p=O.OOO). 
An evaluation of the industry dummy variables reveals that the coefficient for financial services dummy is negative 
... 
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and significant (-0.180, p=0.007). The coefficient for health sector dummy is positive and significant at 5 
p=0.005). The coefficient for ICT dummy is positive but not statistically significant at 5% (0.559, p=0.069). 
coefficient for Industrial goods dummy is negative and significant at 5% (-1.929, p=O.OOO). 
The coefficient for Natural Resource industry dummy is negative (-1.353, p=0.098). In addition, we find that the 
coefficient for Oil and Gas industry dummy iJ positive and significant at 5%. The coefficient for Services indust!l 
dummy is but positive (0.224, p=O.OOO). The result shows that Health sector dummy, Industry sector dummy, Oil and 
gas dummy and services dummy are significantly related to AUDFEE. The significant impact of these dummy variabl~ 
indicates that the economic sector is a determinant of Audit fees. 
Discussion of Results 
The positive and statistical significance of Firm Size indicates that larger firms would have to pay higher audit price and 
hence we accept HI. The most dominant determinant of audit fees found across virtually all published studies is firm 
size and our finding is consistent with Simunic (1980) that provided one of the earliest empirical evidence on the link 
between firm size and Audit fee. Also our finding is in tandem with Steward and Munro (2007). Our finding is in also in 
agreement with Joshi and Bastaki, (2000) Rubin, (1988) Gonthier- Besacier and Schatt, (2007) Ahmed and Goyal, 
(2005). In addition, our finding replicates what Fukukava (2011) discovered also for the Japanese market. The study 
revealed client's size influences the cost of the audit .Dinh (2012) found from his study that size is also positively 
associated with audit fees. 
The negative and statistical significance of PROFITABILITY suggest that the audit fee increases with reductions in 
financial performance and hence we accept H2. Client financial performance is often considered another measure of 
risk because it reflects the extent to which the auditor may be exposed to loss in the event that a client is not financially 
viable and eventually fails (Simunic 1980). In general, the worse the performance of the organization, the more risk to 
the auditor and the higher the audit fee is expected to be. Our finding is in tandem with Hay, Knechel and Wong (2004) 
and Chan et al. (1993). However, it is in contrast with Joshi & Bastaki (2000) and Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, (2007). 
The positive and statistical significance of Complexity indicates that audit pricing increases with the complexity of firm 
especially with regards to the number of subsidiaries and hence we accept H3. Auditee complexity is of interest in 
researching determinants of audit fees (e.g Joshi and Bastaki, 2000; Rubin, 1988; Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt, 2007; 
Ahmed and Goyal, 2005; Thinggaard and Kiertzner, 2008). The result of these studies is consistent with the view that 
auditee complexity has a positive relation with a• fees. In contrast however, Ahmed and Goyal (2005) however do 
not find such relation. 
The negative and statistical significance Year-end (VEND) suggests that undertaking audits within peak periods may 
reduce the audit price other than in non-peak periods and hence we accept H4. The finding is similar to that of 
Fukukava (2011) for the Japanese market. This however, seem not to be consistent with theoretical expectation. 
Previous researches point out auditor behaviors can be affected by a higher demand for audit services during the busy 
season (Lopez and Sweeney and Summers 2002; Lopez and Peters, 2011). Available evidence (Gonthier-Besacier and 
Schatt, 2007; Pong, 2004) seem to show a positive relationship though Hay (2006) argued that evidence to support this 
is quite mixed. The positive and statistical significance of IND suggest that the industry where a firm operates 
particularly for financial and non-financial industries have significant impact on what the audit fees will be and hence 
we accept H5. The finding is consistent with that Anderson and Zeghal (1994) which found same for Canadian 
companies. Our finding is also similar with that of Gonthier-Besacier and Schatt (2007). 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
The objective of this paper is to provide greater insight into how client characteristics may influence audit fees. An 
important dimension of this study is the of use fixed effects techniques and thus taking unobserved firm differences 
into account on one hand and also the introduction of sector dummy variables in our estimation and hence 
investigating if activity sectors moderate the client characteristics-audit fee relationship. Following the agency ~ 
perspective, we argue that from the demand side, client characteristics will impact on audit fees. The findings of the 
study shows that client size, Profitability, Complexity, Fiscal Year end and Industry exerts a significant effect on audit 
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tees in Nigeria. The results seem robust despite controlling for industry of operation of the firms using dummies. The 
study recommends that that there is the need for effective regulation of audit pricing in the Nigerian environment. 
1be market framework for determining the audit fees may not readily suffice as an advantage for the fostering of 
r dependence. 
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Variable: LOG(AUDFEE) 
Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) 
13 Time: 11:26 
20052011 
panel (unbalanced) observations: 1069 
estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Appendix 
period standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
lNG: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error 
c 170.8257 4.341264 
COMP 0.158166 0.017199 
FISYR -12.17019 5.851619 
IND 3.117508 2.204531 
PROFIT -1.08E-06 7.75E-06 
SIZE 1.38E-05 6.27E-06 
t-Statistic 
39.34931 
9.196409 
-2.079799 
1.414137 
-0.139888 
2.195532 
Effects Specification 
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables) 
R-squared 0.720795 
Adjusted R-squared 0.672677 
S.E. of regression 493.2776 
F-statistic 14.97981 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
R-squared 0.510991 
Sum squared resid 4.03E+08 
llendent Variable: LOG(AUDFEE) 
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section weights) 
Date: 11/12/13 Time: 12:13 
Sample: 2005 2011 
Periods included: 7 
loss-sections included: 153 
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 1069 
Weighted Statistics 
Mean dependent var 
S.D. dependentvar 
Sum squared resid 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Unwelghted Statistics 
Mean dependent var 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Appendix 2 
lear estimation after one-step weighting matrix · 
~cross-section standard errors & covariance ( d.f. corrected) 
WARNING: estimated coefficient covariance matrix is of reduced rank 
Vol.4 No.1 2014 
Pro b. 
0.0000 
0.0000 
0.0378 
0.1577 
0.8888 
0.0284 
507.0566 
865.4240 
2.22E+08 
1.378459 
171.9875 
0.972176 

